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The Environmental Due Diligence Defense and
Contractual Protection Devices
In the last decade, potential liability for environmental contamination
has grown tremendously, affecting parties not normally involved in the
generation, treatment, storage, disposal, or transportation of hazardous
wastes. Financial lenders have been held liable, as have purchasers,
lessors, lessees, shareholders who are also officers of a corporation, and
other parties involved in transactions involving immovable property.
Because of this potential liability, virtually every transaction involving
real property carries some risk of environmental liability. Recognizing
the danger, parties to these types of transactions are attempting to protect
themselves in a variety of ways.
Protection devices can be found in two general areas. The first
device is the "third party defense," which allows innocent parties who
acquire property to avoid liability for the cost of response. The other
method of protection is contractual; parties can draft provisions which
regulate their rights and responsibilities in a transaction involving en-
vironmental risk. Both of these areas of protection should be explored
in order to be afforded the maximum protection.
This comment examines the types of environmental risks arising in
real estate transactions and offers some suggestions for avoiding those
risks. Section I reviews the statutory and jurisprudential sources of
liability for environmental contamination. Section II explores these en-
vironmental risks from the perspectives of the various parties involved
in such transactions. Finally, section III examines the available protection
devices with particular emphasis placed on the due diligence inquiry
under the third party defense.
Statutory Jungle
While many state and federal statutes provide for environmental
regulation and liability, two federal statutes serve to define the primary
risks related to immovable property transactions. The Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act (RCRA) regulates the management of haz-
ardous waste from generation to disposal. The Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)
provides the federal government with the authority to clean up existing
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hazardous waste sites and imposes liability upon those legally responsible
for the costs of response.
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)1
RCRA is primarily intended to prevent the creation of new hazardous
Waste sites. It achieves this goal by regulating not only disposal facilities, 2
but also generators3 and transporters4 of hazardous waste. RCRA's
primary regulatory mechanism is a manifest system, which requires every
party handling hazardous wastes to trace the waste from generation to
disposal.' Beyond this, RCRA imposes more specific requirements on
each class of hazardous waste handler.
Owners and operators of hazardous waste treatment, storage, and
disposal (TSD) facilities must comply with detailed and complex regu-
lations under RCRA. 6 Records must be maintained as to all hazardous
Waste treated, stored, or disposed of in the facilityi and all reporting
and monitoring must be done within the manifest system. The regulations
also establish detailed technical requirements with respect to treatment,
storage, or disposal practices, construction of TSD facilities, and training
of personnel. Finally, every TSD facility must comply with the specific
requirements of its permit. 7
The EPA regulations under RCRA defines a generator as "any
person, . . . whose act or process produces hazardous waste identified
or listed [as hazardous] or whose act first causes hazardous waste to
become subject to regulation." 8 The regulations originally excluded small
quantity generators, but today most are subject to similar, though less
stringent, requirements.9 Basically, a generator must identify and label
hazardous wastes and furnish information about their chemical com-
position to those transporting, storing, treating, or disposing of the
waste. In addition, the generator is the first step in the manifest system
and must be able to track the waste to a TSD facility.10
1. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-91 (West Supp. 1988).
2. Id. at § 6924.
3. Id. at § 6922.
4. Id. at § 6923,
5. Id. at § 6903(12).
6. 40 C.F.R. § 264 (1988).
7. U.S.C.A. § 6925 (West Supp. 1988), provides that every TSD facility must obtain
a permit under RCRA, or qualify as an "interim status" facility.
8. 40 C.F.R. § 260.10 (1988) (the term is not generically defined in the statute
itself).
9. C.F.R. § 260.10 (1988); generators producing less than one hundred kilograms
of hazardous waste per month are generally not subject to RCRA regulation, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 6921(d).
10. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6922 (West Supp. 1988).
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A transporter is defined under the regulations as anyone "engaged
in the offsite transportation of hazardous waste by air, rail, highway,
or water."" Basically, a transporter is responsible for complying with
extensive reporting requirements in the event of a release during trans-
portation.' 2 In addition, a transporter perpetuates the manifest system
by retaining copies for at least three (3) years and refusing to accept
hazardous waste without the appropriate manifest. 3
The Act provides for both civil and criminal penalties for violations,
including injunctive relief.' 4 Anyone who intentionally fails to comply
with any of the Act's requirements is subject to criminal sanctions of
a maximum of two years imprisonment and fines up to fifty thousand
dollars." If a violator has knowledge that the violation may place another
in imminent danger of serious bodily harm, the criminal sanctions in-
crease to fifteen years imprisonment and two hundred and fifty thousand
dollars. If the violator is a corporation, the maximum fine increases to
one million dollars.' 6 If the violation was not intentional, the violator
faces civil penalties of up to twenty five thousand dollars per day.' 7
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA)'5
CERCLA is a remedial rather than a regulatory statute. It was
hurriedly passed as a compromise in the waning years of the Carter
Administration, primarily to deal with sites such as the Love Canal,
which were so dangerous that immediate clean up action was required.
It is most often used to deal with inactive, abahdoned, or illegal haz-
ardous waste sites, although it should also apply to existing facilities.' 9
CERCLA authorizes the EPA to arrange for the removal of dan-
gerous substances from waste sites, or to take any other action consistent
with the national contingency plan whenever there is a release or threat-
ened release of any hazardous substances presenting a danger to the
11. 40 C.F.R. § 260.10 (1988) (the term is not defined in the statute itself). A
transporter who stores hazardous waste for more than ten (10) days becomes an "operator"
of a TSD facility and must comply with those regulations as well. 40 C.F.R. § 263.12
(1988).
12. 40 C.F.R. § 263.30-.31 (1988).
13. 40 C.F.R. § 263.20-.22 (1988).
14. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(a) (West Supp. 1988).
15. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d) (West Supp. 1988).
16. Id. at § 6928(e).
17. Id. at § 6928(a)(3), (g).
18. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-75 (West Supp. 1988). Louisiana hazardous waste provisions
can be found in La. R.S. 30:2171-2206 (1989).
19. Note, Federal Preemption of State Law Environmental Remedies After Interna-
tional Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 49 La. L. Rev. 193, 210-13 (1988).
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public health. 20 If necessary, these response actions can be funded by
"Superfund," a fund established by CERCLA to provide the government
with the financial resources to respond to a hazardous waste release. 21
The primary costs of response, however, are to be borne by private
"responsible parties."
To abate the danger presented by the waste site, the EPA can
proceed in a number of ways. It can undertake the response action
itself using the Superfund and later seek reimbursement from those
responsible for the site. 22 However, such a course of action increases
the financial risk on the Superfund in the event of the insolvency of
one or more of the responsible parties. Therefore, it is usually preferable
to obtain injunctive relief against the responsible parties, or to issue an
administrative order to a potentially responsible party to begin a private
response action. 23
The Act can have far reaching effects for a potentially responsible
party, which may include a current owner or operator, an owner or
operator at the time the waste was deposited, a generator, or a trans-
porter of hazardous wastes. 24 The liability of lenders, purchasers, lessors
and lessees usually occurs under "owner or operator" status.
Section 101 of the Act defines the term "owner or operator" broadly.
Generally, it includes anyone who has owned or otherwise controlled
the activity of the releasing facility. 2 However, the Act excludes from
the definition "a person, who, without participating in the management
of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect
his security interest in the vessel or facility. ' 26 The security interest
exclusion presents two important issues. The first concerns the level of
activity of the lender which would constitute participation in the man-
agement of the borrower's vessel or facility. The second issue concerns
whether a lender that forecloses on its collateral holds indicia of own-
ership primarily to protect its security interest.
The issue of the lender's participation in management was discussed
in the case of United States v. Mirabile.2 7 The most important element
of Mirabile dealt with the bank's participation in the activities of the
20. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(a)(1) (West Supp. 1988). The National contingency plan is
published by the EPA under 42 U.S.C.A. § 9605 (West Supp. 1988), and contains the
plan for removal of oil and hazardous substances.
21. "Superfund" refers to the fund established by CERCLA to provide the government
with the financial resources to respond to a hazardous waste release, 42 U.S.C. § 9631
(1983).
22. Id.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1983).
24. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (West Supp. 1988).
25. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A) (West Supp. 1988).
26. Id.
27. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
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borrower, which could destroy the exclusion even if the bank intended
to act merely to protect its security interest. The district court held that
American Bank qualified for the exemption because it had not become
"overly entangled" in the borrower's hazardous waste activities. The
same conclusion could not be reached, however, for a second lender,
Mellon Bank.
Mellon's predecessor held a security interest in the inventory and
assets of Turco Coatings, a paint manufacturer. When Turco began
experiencing financial difficulties, the bank became involved in the com-
pany's operations. An officer of the bank served on an advisory board
overseeing Turco's operations, while another officer monitored the com-
pany's financial condition. As Turco's financial situation worsened, the
bank's involvement grew to include weekly visits and instructions con-
cerning personnel and manufacturing. Turco ceased operations and the
bank seized its inventory, but did not acquire title to the property.
Reviewing section 101(20)(A), the court determined that the partic-
ipation in the management of the borrower must occur in connection
with the "facility" in order to destroy the exclusion. "Facility" is defined
in section (101)(9) of the Act to include the structure or site where
hazardous substances are located. 28 Thus, the court concluded that a
secured party would lose the exclusion only if it participated in the
actual operation of the facility, not merely participate in the borrower's
financial decisions. The issue of whether Mellon participated in the
actual operation of the facility was reserved for the presentation of
further evidence at trial, but the parties settled. Today, the level of
participation in the borrower's activities that would destroy the exclusion
is still open to question.
The issue of whether foreclosure on the property destroys the ex-
clusion was faced by the United States District Court in Maryland in
United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.29 In this case, Maryland
Bank had loaned money for the operation of two garbage businesses
at a site in which the bank held a security interest. When the borrower
defaulted, the bank instituted foreclosure proceedings and purchased the
property at the foreclosure sale. The bank continued to own the property
when the EPA discovered improperly disposed wastes more than one
year later. The wastes had been deposited before the bank foreclosed
on the property. When the EPA ordered Maryland Bank to conduct a
clean up, the bank refused, forcing the EPA to conduct the clean up
itself.
The United States brought suit demanding that Maryland Bank
reimburse the Superfund for over $500,000.00 of response costs. The
28. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(9) (West Supp. 1988).
29. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
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government argued that a current owner is liable for response costs
regardless of fault.30 The bank contended that it was not an "owner
or operator" as those terms are defined in section 101(20)(A), since it
held indicia of ownership merely to protect its security interest in the
facility.
On a motion for summary judgment, the court rejected the argument
that Maryland Bank was exempted from the definition of owner or
operator because it was merely protecting its security interest. It reasoned
that the verb tense used in the exclusion exempted only one who "holds"
the security interest at the time of the clean up. Since the mortgage
held by the bank terminated at the foreclosure sale when the bank
acquired full title, the bank was not entitled to the exclusion.3 Thus,
Maryland Bank was ari "owner" and was strictly liable without regard
to causation.3 2
This issue was also addressed in the earlier case of United States
v. Miabile.33 But in contrast to the position taken in Maryland Bank,
the Mirabile court held that American Bank, which foreclosed and held
title for only four months before assigning its interest, acted to protect
its security interest and was, therefore, exempt as an owner under section
101(20)(A).14 The Maryland Bank court attempted to distinguish this
aspect of Mirabile due to the short time that American Bank held title,
but specifically disagreed with the holding to the extent that it could
not be distinguished. 3
In addition to the security interest exemption, CERCLA also provides
a limited defense for an owner or operator. If the owner or operator
can prove that the act or omission causing the release was solely the
fault of a third party, and he can also establish that he exercised due
care once the presence of the hazardous substances was discovered, the
owner or operator is not liable.36 However, a "third party" does not
include "an employee or agent of the defendant, or . . .one whose act
or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship, existing
directly or indirectly, with the defendant . . .-.
The court in Maryland Bank remanded for trial the issues raised
by this defense. It refused to preclude Maryland Bank from raising the
defense due to its lengthy business relationship with the owners of the
30. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) (Present
owners are liable even though they had not contributed to the contamination).
31. Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 579.
32. Id. at 578, citing Shore Realty, supra note 30.
33. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
34. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994, 20966 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
35. Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 580.




waste site. Instead, it requested more evidence as to the status of the
relationship at the time the dumping occurred. Specifically, the court
inquired into the existence of any outstanding loans during the time of
the operations which caused the contamination.3" This suggests that the
mere existence of an outstanding loan during the disposal period could
be enough to preclude the application of the third party defense when
the mortgagee becomes the owner because of the contractual relationship
between mortgagee and mortgagor. However, Maryland Bank also settled
before this issue came to trial.
The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA)
attempted to clarify this defense by defining the term "contractual
relationship." 9 Section 101(35) of CERCLA now provides that the term
does not include a defendant who acquired the property after the disposal
of the wastes if the defendant can show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that at the time of acquisition it neither knew nor had any
reason to know of the presence of hazardous wastes on the property.
The definition also requires the defendant to satisfy sections 107(b)(3)(a)
and (b), which require it to exercise due care and to take proper
precautions after the wastes are discovered.4° In addition, the definition
attempts to provide some guidance to the courts by enumerating the
factors that a defendant must establish in proving that it had "no reason
to know:"
"... the defendant must have undertaken, at the time of ac-
quisition, all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership
and uses of the property consistent with good commercial or
customary practice in an effort to minimize liability. For pur-
poses of the preceding sentence the court shall take into account
any specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the
defendant, the relationship of the purchase price to the value
of the property if uncontaminated, commonly known or rea-
sonably ascertainable information about the property, the ob-
viousness of the presence or likely presence of contamination at
the property, and the ability to detect such contamination by
appropriate inspection.' '41
Finally, the section requires any owner who discovers the presence of
hazardous wastes during his period of ownership to disclose that fact
38. Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 581.
39. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(A) (West Supp. 1988).
40. Id. at § 9607(b)(3)(a) and (b). See also H.R. 99-253(v), 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
4(1986); 1986 U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News 3124, 3280 (imposes "due care which
is reasonable under the circumstances" standard once discover presence of waste. This
includes steps taken to protect the public from the threat).
41. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(B) (West Supp. 1988).
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to subsequent owners. If he fails to do so, he is liable under CERCLA
and may not claim the section 107(b)(3) defense. 42
SARA also allows the EPA to impose a conventional lien against
property when the clean up was financed with the Superfund. However,
this lien primes other rights against the land only from the time of
recordation.4 3 The majority of state environmental liens operate the same
way. In Louisiana, the Secretary of the Department of Environmental
Quality may file a declaration of abandonment in the mortgage records
of the parish where the property is located. From the date of recordation,
the declaration operates as a lien to the extent of state expenditures on
the response action. However, an owner of the site may file an action
to have the lien erased if the owner can show he "in no way caused
by any action or negligence" the contamination of the site. 4
Outside of Louisiana, the lender or other lienholder must be aware
of potential state "superlien" statutes, such as those enacted in Con-
necticut, 45 Massachusetts, 46 and New Jersey.47 These liens receive priority
over encumbrances recorded after the effective date of the statute even
though the clean up itself occurred after such recordation. Other states
have even more stringent lien statutes, and the parties to every transaction
involving environmental risk should take care in examining the laws of
the state where the property is located.4
Beyond liability for clean-up costs, CERCLA also establishes an
administrative civil penalty system, divided by classes. The EPA may
impose Class I Administrative Penalties upon anyone who violated re-
porting or record keeping requirements, or orders relating to settlement
agreements, or consent decrees.4 9 Class II Administrative Penalties may
be assessed for the same violations.50 The difference between the two
classes is merely the types of penalties assessed. Class I penalties may
be up to $25,000 per violation, while Class II penalties may be up to
$25,000 per day. If the same violations are repeated, these penalties
may increase to $75,000 per day. Criminal penalties for notice, record
keeping, and false reporting violations may reach up to five years
imprisonment. 5
42. Id. at § 9601(35)(C) (sometimes referred to as the "innocent landowner defense"
or "third party defense").
43. Id. at § 9607(l)(3).
44. La. R.S. § 30:2225(F) (1989).
45. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 22a-452a (West Supp. 1988).
46. Mass. Gen. L. ch. 21 E. § 13 (1988).
47. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 58:10-23.11 (West 1988).
48. Bozarth, Environmental Liens and Title Insurance, 1989 Law. Title News (Jan.-
Feb.) 19.
49. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9609(a) (West Supp. 1988).
50. Id. at § 9609(b).
51. Id. at 9603(b)(3).
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These statutory and jurisprudential developments under CERCLA
have affected not only lenders, but other parties as well. "Owner or
operator" has been held to include present owners who did not contribute
to the pollution of the site;52 former owners as sellers;53 a firm who
acted as a conduit for a transfer, holding title for only one hour;14 an
owner/lessor whose lessee caused contamination of the site;55 a lessee
who caused contamination;5 6 a sublessor for contamination caused by
his sublessee;1" and a Vice President and major shareholder responsible
for wastes disposed of by his corporation. 8 These classes of defendants
share many of the same concerns, particularly those relating to own-
ership. To that extent, the concerns and techniques being developed by
lenders are applicable to all classes of owners. However, each class of
potential owners or operators has some concerns and protection tech-
niques not inimical to the other classes. To this extent, the perspectives
of lenders, purchasers, lessors and lessees are analyzed separately.
Nature of the Risks Involved
The Lender's Perspective
The costs of compliance with a broad regulatory statute such as
RCRA can be burdensome. Moreover, the costs of noncompliance can
be even more substantial given the extent of civil and criminal penalties
available to the EPA. This may seriously affect the solvency of the
borrower, especially as a greater number of small generators become
subject to the requirements of the Act. Lenders should factor these costs
into the decision to extend credit.59
Another problem is the failure of either RCRA or its implementing
regulations to define the terms "owner" or "operator" with sufficient
specificity. 60 RCRA offers no exclusion for a person who holds indicia
52. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
53. Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
54. United States v. Carolawn Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20699 (D.S.C.
1984).
55. United States v. Argent Corp., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20616 (D.N.M.
1984).
56. United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc., 21 Envt. Rep. Cas.
1577 (D.S.C. 1984).
57. Id.
58. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co., 579 F. Supp.
823 (W.D. Mo. 1984); see also New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052
(2d Cir. 1985).
59. King, Lender's Liability For Cleanup Costs, 18 Envtl. L. 241, 250 (1988).
60. Id. at 251-252. "Owner" is defined in the regulations as "the person who owns
a facility or a part of a facility," while "operator" is defined as "the person responsible
for the overall operation of the facility." 40 C.F.R. § 260.10 (1988).
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of ownership to protect a security interest. Thus, a lender who takes
title may be liable as an owner or operator who contributed to the past
or present handling of hazardous waste, which could make the lender
subject to RCRA enforcement actions and penalties. There is no guar-
antee that a CERCLA-like exclusion for a lender protecting its security
interest will be read into RCRA by the courts. 6'
The greatest potential for lender liability, however, arises under
CERCLA. After the Mirabile and Maryland Bank decisions, it is clear
that a lender can become liable as an owner or operator both during
and after the loan period.62 During the loan, the borrower may begin
to experience financial trouble, triggering the lender's temptation to
become involved in the management of the borrower's business in order
to prevent it from defaulting on the loan. The Mirable court suggested
that the lender could become involved in the financial decisions of the
borrower without incurring liability, but could not become involved in
the actual operation of the facility. 6a This position is consistent with
section 101(20), which provides that a person may be excluded from
the definition of "owner or operator" only if he did not participate in
the management of a facility, but allows one to protect his security
interest in the facility by holding indicia of ownership. Thus, the Act
itself appears to differentiate between the purely financial aspect of
management and the operational aspect of management.
This argument was recently embraced by a federal district court in
Georgia. In United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.,64 a lender had a security
interest in the borrower's inventory, accounts receivable, equipment, and
realty. As the borrower became financially troubled, the lender began
"wind-down" operations, which included seizing and selling some of
the borrower's inventory. The borrower went into bankruptcy, but the
lender continued to finance the borrower as a debtor-in-possession.
Finally, when the lender cut off financing, the borrower ceased oper-
ations. Upon the final liquidation of inventory, the lender continued to
check the credit of customers of the borrower, as was its practice. The
funds generated through these sales went to the lender as partial payment.
Eventually, the lender foreclosed on the remaining inventory and equip-
61. King, supra note 59, at 252.
62. Recently, a bill was introduced in the Congress that would remove "commercial
lending institutions" from the definition of "owner or operator" when such institutions
take title to foreclosed property or when they acquire contaminated realty in the capacity
of a trustee for an estate (HR 2085). This bill, if passed, would protect lenders in most
cases from environmental liability under Superfund, and thus remove the necessity of
conducting a due diligence inquiry. See 3 Toxics L. Rep. 1576.
63. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994, 20997 (E.D.
Pa. 1985).
64. No. CV687-070 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 22, 1988).
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ment and sold it, contracting with a firm to remove all equipment and
inventory not yet removed by the purchasers. At no time did the lender
foreclose on the realty.
The EPA later discovered 700 drums of toxic chemicals and asbestos
throughout the plant. The United States sued the lender as an "owner
or operator," stating that it went "far beyond merely protecting its
security interest." The district court held that the lender was not an
owner or operator because it had no control or access, nor had it
engaged in any other activities at the facility. The court stated that
lenders could provide financial assistance and even "isolated instances
of specific management advice," as long as the lender did not participate
in day to day management of the facility. 65 Because the activities of
the lender were consistent with the protection of its security interest,
and the lender did not take title to the property, the court's decision
appears correct.
If the borrower defaults, the lender may foreclose on the facility
and have it sold to recoup the outstanding loan balance. Most often,
the lender will have to take title to the facility, either through a dation
en paiement or by purchasing it at the foreclosure sale if no other
buyers are available. In either case, the Maryland Bank decision presents
a substantial risk of liability to the lender. As owner, the former lender
may be liable for response costs under CERCLA without regard to
causation. While the length of time the former lender holds title to the
property may prove to be a relevant factor in the future, there is strong
language in Maryland Bank to suggest that the lender may become liable
as soon as title passes. 66 In order to protect itself as an "owner," the
lender would then have to assert the third party defense. Given the
limited governmental funds available for response actions, it is likely
that the courts will follow Maryland Bank and hold that the lender
may be liable as an owner as soon as title passes, unless it can avail
itself of the third party defense. Such a result provides a possible "deep
pocket" in the form of a potentially responsible party unless the lender
comes forward with proof that he acted without knowledge or control
over the contamination of the site.
The penalty provisions of CERCLA present problems similar to
those encountered under RCRA. If the borrower is assessed with non-
compliance penalties, his solvency may become tenuous, even if the
65. At this time, an appeal is pending before the Eleventh Circuit.
66. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20996, held that a lender who held title for only
four months was merely protecting its security interest. While United States v. Maryland
Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579 (D. Md. 1986), suggested that this carried
some weight, it specifically held that the Bank's security interest terminated when it
obtained full title, and it therefore, could not have acted to protect its security interest.
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environmental problems arise on a property unrelated to the loan. 61
Furthermore, if the property is located in a state with a superlien statute,
the secured lender may lose its priority even over uncontaminated prop-
erty.6 8 These factors must be considered in the decision to make or
reject the loan.
Another serious problem for lenders is the devaluation of property
pledged as collateral, either because of contamination on the property
itself, or on neighboring properties. If the collateral itself has been
contaminated, the stigma attached to it may make it unmarketable, even
if the property was cleaned up or no clean-up was required. 69 If the
collateral is simply in close proximity to a contaminated site or a site
presenting an environmental risk, neighboring property values are also
likely to be impaired. 70 In addition, environmental superliens could attach
which would prime pre-existing liens and further devalue the property. 7'
Lenders should be sure that these environmental factors are being con-
sidered in their appraisal of the potential collateral. When appraised in
light of these factors, many properties will have a negative value.
The above discussion indicates that lenders should carefully inves-
tigate every loan transaction to avoid environmental risk. The existence
of the third party defense provides some protection, but in order to
claim the defense, the lender's investigation must conform to the de-
veloping doctrine of environmental due diligence. To a large extent, this
removes the decision making process from the hands of the loan officer
and places it in the hands of the lawyer, who must assess the legal risk
associated with the proposed transaction. Decisions must now be made
not only with regard to the soundness of the collateral and the solvency
of the borrower, but also with regard to the rather amorphous concept
of environmental due diligence.
SARA's definition of "contractual relationship" gave life to what
was in practice a narrow third party defense. As the Maryland Bank
court suggested, the mere existence of a borrower-lender relationship
during the contamination of the site could have destroyed the defense. 2
Now, however, a bank in the same position would have a defense,
67. King, supra note 59, at 265. See also Note, Cleaning Up in Bankruptcy: Curbing
Abuse of the Federal Bankruptcy Code by Industrial Polluters, 85 Columbia L. Rev. 870-
871, n.14 (1985), suggesting that increases in bankruptcies by firms operating hazardous
waste sites indicate that such companies are routinely undercapitalized.
68. King, supra note 59, at 265.
69. Miller and Bennett, Due Diligence Techniques For the Innocent Purchase/Lender,
3 Toxics L. Rep. 434 (1988).
70. Id. at 435.
71. Murphy, The Impact of "Superfund" and Other Environmental Statutes on
Commercial Lending and Investment Activities, 41 Bus. Law. 1133, 1152 (1986).
72. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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notwithstanding the contractual relationship, if it could show it neither
knew nor had any reason to know of the presence of the wastes at the
time of acquisition. 71
The requirement that the lender have "no reason to know" of the
presence of the wastes appears to establish a constructive knowledge
standard. It is clear that there is a subjective element-the lender must
not have known of the wastes. There is also an objective element, but
the court is not free to apply any factors it deems relevant. Rather,
the inquiry is specifically limited by statutory terms such as "good
commercial and customary practices," and "specialized knowledge," as
well as by other factors. 74
Beyond liability risks, there is an additional reason to conduct the
environmental investigation in conformity with the due diligence defense.
The secondary mortgage market has recognized the environmental risk
and has begun to formulate policies and conditions to be met before
purchasing mortgages. 75 Since lenders will have to conform to these
conditions before selling the loans, there is a great chance that the
policies of the secondary markets will influence "good commercial prac-
tices" and other statutory terms defining the objective element of the
due diligence defense. For this reason, the policies of the Federal National
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (Freddie Mac), and other secondary market institutions are
particularly relevant when analyzing the appropriate level of inquiry in
a given fact pattern involving a lender. 76
The Purchaser's Perspective
Purchasers of real property share many of the same concerns as
lenders. Specifically, purchasers are concerned with their obvious status
as "owners" under CERCLA. When a purchaser acquires title to the
property, he is a "current owner or operator" and is thus liable without
regard to causation. 77 For this reason, every purchaser of immovable
property must be prepared to meet the third party defense.
However, the nature of the problem is somewhat less complicated
for purchasers. They are acquiring an interest in the property now, not
sometime in the future. Therefore, they do not have to be concerned
73. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
74. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(B) (West Supp. 1988). United States v. Serafini, 706 F.
Supp. 346 (M.D. Pa. 1988).
75. Miller and Bennett, Environmental Risk: Are Your Loans Marketable?, 3 Toxics
L. Rep. 618 (1988).
76. Discussed more thoroughly in section entitled "Protection Devices," infra notes
81-130 and accompanying text.
77. New York v. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
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with contamination during the loan period, as do lenders. Furthermore,
what is "good commercial practice" will depend on the sophistication
or "specialized knowledge" of the purchaser. Lenders, on the other
hand, will probably be held to a more uniform, industry-wide standard.
The concerns of lenders, however, are equally applicable to purchasers,
at least to the extent thai lenders are concerned with ownership of
contaminated property.
The Perspective of Lessees and Lessors
The majority of problems involving contaminated real property will
likely involve tenants." Unlike purchasers, the landlord and the tenant
are bound to continue the relationship after the wastes are discovered,
unless the agreement contemplated otherwise. Because both the lessor
and the lessee are potentially responsible parties under CERCLA, the
parties should consider environmental risks when negotiating the lease.
The lessee will be concerned that it might become liable for prior
contamination of the site, or for contamination concurrently caused by
the lessor or a third party. Because the lessee controls the property, he
stands in the shoes of the owner, and is liable under CERCLA on that
basis for any contamination occuring during his lease. 79 As for prior
contamination, the lessee should not be liable as an owner or operator
because the element of control is lacking and the lessee does not hold
title to the property. In this situation, the lessee will primarily be
concerned with proving that the contamination was caused prior to his
possession of the property. To do this, he may wish to conduct a due
diligence inquiry similar to that done by defendants hoping to claim
the third party defense.
Lessors, on the other hand, are concerned that the lessee might
contaminate the site during the lease period. Even before SARA defined
the term "contractual relationship", at least one court concluded that
the third party defense was unavailable to a lessor due to the contractual
relationship with the lessee causing the contamination. 0 The result should
be the same after SARA. Under the present definition of the term, a
lessor cannot show that he had "no reason to know" of the presence
of the contamination at the time of acquisition of the property. This
language appears to preclude the lessor from raising the third party
78. Larsen and Boman, "Environmental Liability: Lender and Landlord-Tenant Is-
sues," The Impact of Environmental Regulation on Business Transactions, Practicing Law
Institute, 273, 282 (Sept. 27, 1988).
79. United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc., 21 Envt. Rep. Cas.
1577 (D.S.C. 1984).




defense because of the contractual relationship with his lessee. He must
therefore rely on contractual protection devices to avoid the financial
burden of environmental response.
Protection Devices
Lenders and Purchasers
The third party defense, or "innocent landowner defense," provides
lenders and purchasers with a rare commodity: a valid defense to a
CERCLA response action. But the defense is not without a price. The
lender who wishes to avail himself of the defense must significantly
increase the level of inquiry into the borrower's activities and the property
itself prior to the loan commitment. This will increase the transactional
costs which will, to some extent, be passed on to the borrower. But to
the extent that the market prevents passing those costs on to the bor-
rower, the lender must make a business decision as to how extensive,
and consequently how costly, his due diligence inquiry will be. For this
reason, the following discussion attempts to present the due diligence
inquiry in a step by step fashion. When the lender is satisfied that the
completed steps suggest an acceptable level of environment risk, he
should be able to end the investigation at a minimal cost.
Before discussing the specific techniques, it is helpful to conceptualize
what environmental due diligence is and what it is designed to accom-
plish. Under the definition of "contractual relationship," a lender or
other defendant will be considered to have "reason to know" of the
contamination of the site at the time of acquisition unless he can show
that "all appropriate inquiry" was conducted prior to the acquisition.
"Due diligence" is merely a shorthand way of referring to the "ap-
propriate inquiry" discussed in the statute. The appropriateness of the
inquiry is modified and limited by statutory language, such as "spe-
cialized knowledge," "appropriate inspection," and "good commercial
or customary practices."'" The level of diligence required to show that
the defendant had "no reason to know" of the presence of wastes on
the site will differ according to these factors . 2
A number of variables can affect the level of diligence required.
The first factor should be the nature of the transaction. If the property
involved is residential property, a lesser inquiry is required than if the
81. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
82. The legislative history confirms the limiting effect intended by this language. It
suggest that the term "specialized knowledge" and other terms means that those in
commercial transactions are to be held to higher standards than those in residential




property was industrial or commercial property. The reason for this is
that the statute requires that previous uses be investigated83 and it is
reasonable to assume that there will be less risk associated with the use
of residential property than with commercial or industrial property. A
second and more important variable affecting the level of diligence
required is the type of defendant. The statute specifies that the "spe-
cialized knowledge" of the defendant must be considered by the court.8 4
A lender will likely have specialized knowledge by virtue of its experience
in commercial matters. Likewise, a homeowner will be held to a lesser
standard than a purchaser of commercial property.8 5
Although not specifically enumerated in the statute, the size of the
transaction should also be a relevant factor. The parties will be more
willing to incur increased transactional costs in a large transaction than
in a smaller transaction. Moreover, the larger the property, the greater
the potential for environmental contamination and extensive liability.
Therefore, it is "good commercial or customary practice" to conduct
a more thorough review in larger transactions.
The final factor should be the ease with which the contamination
could have been discovered. The statute specifies that a court should
consider the "obviousness" of the presence of contamination, the ability
to detect the contamination by appropriate inspection, and how "com-
monly known or reasonably ascertainable" information about the prop-
erty was to the defendant.8 6 If barrels of wastes are visible or noxious
odors emanate from the property, even an unsophisticated purchaser
should be held to have had knowledge of the contamination. Further-
more, if contamination of this or adjacent property has been widely
publicized, this should constitute "commonly known" information about
the property, thus destroying the defense.
Because most transactions today involve loans, the due diligence
defense has been developed primarily by lenders. For this reason, the
following discussion will focus on the loan process, keeping in mind
that many of the due diligence techniques apply equally to purchasers.
The wary lender might be tempted to construct a rigid, compre-
hensive due diligence procedure for every type of transaction, or for
every transaction involving commercial or industrial property, or for
every transaction above a certain size. This is unwise for two reasons.
First, the appropriate level of diligence is modified by the term "good
commercial or customary practices." If lenders, in an over-abundance
of caution, routinely establish detailed and expensive procedures, they
83. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(B) (West Supp. 1988).
84. Id.
85. 3 Toxics L. Rep. 832 (1988).
86. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(B) (West Supp. 1988).
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run the risk that this will establish what is a good commercial practice.17
Banks who do less may lose their defense, even if such techniques were
unnecessary in a particular transaction. Second, these lenders will un-
necessarily increase their transaction costs and potentially drive them-
selves out of the loan market.
Instead, lenders should develop a system for evaluating each trans-
action. To do this, lenders must understand that their goal is due
diligence at the time of acquisition, not at the time of the loan com-
mitment. 8 The reasons for doing the initial inquiry at the time of the
loan application is, of course, to avoid taking a security interest in
property that cannot be seized in the future without environmental
liability. When the lender decides to foreclose, these techniques must
be repeated to ensure that the property has not since been contaminated
by the borrower.
There are certain minimal techniques, however, which should be
included in every transaction. At some point every lender will likely sell
its mortgages in the secondary mortgage market. As mentioned, the
leaders in the secondary market have already begun to develop envi-
ronmental risk policies that require various due diligence techniques to
be conducted as a condition to the purchase commitment.8 9 These agen-
cies are primarily concerned with residential property, which generally
involves little environmental risk. Therefore, because the primary lender
cannot function in commerce without access to the secondary market,
these policies should be considered to define the minimum of what is
good commercial practice by the primary lender.
Single-family property, presenting the least amount of environmental
risk, logically requires only a minimal level of diligence. However, it is
not completely free from environmental concerns. For example, its value
as collateral may be impaired by on site or neighboring contamination.
The key element of due diligence in this context is how "commonly
known" the potential risk is in the community. Recognizing this, Fannie
Mae places the primary burden on real estate appraisers to search the
public records for relevant information and to consider these factors in
determining the fair market value of the property. 90 The lender should
be able to rely on the appraiser's onsite inspection and record search
as constituting a proper due diligence inquiry in single family transac-
tions. If the appraiser fails to properly investigate the property, the
87. Mott and Slaughter, Minimizing Lender Environmental Liability: The Most Com-
mon Mistakes, 3 Toxics L. Rep. 861 (1988).
88. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(A) (West Supp. 1988); Id. at 863; see also the summary
of EPA policy in Miller and Bennett, supra note 66, at 436.
89. Miller and Bennett, Environmental Risk: Are Your Loans Marketable?, 3 Toxics
L. Rep. 618 (1988).
90. Id. at 620.
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lender should lose his defense because information about the contami-
nation was "commonly known" from the public records or by a simple
on-site inspection.
Beyond single-family transactions, Fannie Mae has established more
detailed guidelines for multi-family residential properties. 91 To prevent
the necessity of conducting a full scale environmental audit in every
situation, Fannie Mae breaks the diligence process into two phases. This
technique is becoming standard in the lending industry and is being
applied as a general structure for the due diligence inquiry in every type
of transaction, including commercial or industrial properties.92 The fol-
lowing discussion provides the general framework for conducting a due
diligence inquiry in various types of transactions and can be used by
either purchasers or lenders.
PHASE I
The first phase of the due diligence inquiry involves five basic
procedures: the loan questionnaire, the chain of title search, the gov-
ernmental records search, interviews of various parties, and the site
inspection. With the possible exception of single family residential trans-
actions where the lender is allowed to rely on the appraiser's investi-
gation, the careful lender should be able to show that it conducted each
of these procedures properly. Otherwise, it might not be able to show
that its decision to forego the phase II environmental audit was prudent
under the circumstances.
The first step a lender should take is to develop an environmental
questionnaire. The questionnaire should address whether the site is vacant
or developed, the nature of the borrower's business, prior activities at
the site, pending environmental enforcement actions or private lawsuits,
and other questions considering the wide range of environmental lia-
bilities that affect different types of businesses. From this information,
a loan officer trained in environmental hazards will assess the potential
risks and conduct further investigations as required. This will allow the
lender to decide the extent of the initial investigation and if the risks
look particularly dangerous, whether to proceed at all.
Assuming the lender has decided to proceed with the property in-
vestigation process, the next step is the title search. CERCLA requires
that the defendant conduct an "appropriate inquiry into the previous
ownership" of the property. 9" Merely asking about prior ownership in
the loan questionnaire would certainly not be appropriate by anyone's
91. Id. at 619.
92. Id.
93. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(B) (West Supp. 1988).
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commercial standards. Thus the lender is required to conduct the title
search.
94
Of course, the title search does not tell the lender anything about
the condition of the property. It does, however, indicate possession of
the property by known polluters, such as chemical companies. It also
provides a starting point for the interview process.
The statute further requires the defendant to conduct an appropriate
inquiry into previous uses of the property. 95 A number of due diligence
techniques are designed to achieve this requirement. Perhaps the most
important is the governmental records search. Governmental agencies at
both the local and national level accumulate information about contam-
inated properties, permit applications, health records, environmental
compliance data, and other r6levant information. Since this information
is available to the general public from federal agencies under the Freedom
6f Information Act (F.O.I.A.), 96 and from state agencies under state
law, 97 the courts will probably require a governmental records search
under the "commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information"
language of CERCLA. 98
At the federal level, the primary source of information should be
the Environmental Protection Agency. Site-specific data should be avail-
able through the F.O.I.A., unless a valid trade secret claim can be
asserted. This information should include: sites listed or targeted for
listing on the National Priorities List99 or RCRA underground storage
tank registry;' °° facilities violating air, water, and hazardous waste laws;
permit applications and permits issued to particular facilities; enforcement
actions; computer lists of settlement actions; and other information
required to be maintained by the EPA.
In addition to using the EPA as a source of information, a lender
or purchaser could obtain information from the filings required to be
made to the Securities Exchange Commission, such as the 10-K disclosure
documents. Companies subject to registration requirements under the
94. Miller and Bennett, Due Diligence Techniques For the Innocent Purchaser/Lender,
3 Toxics L. Rep. 434, 437 (1988).
95. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(B) (West Supp. 1988).
96. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1983).
97. For example, in Louisiana, similar rules can be found in La. R.S. 44:1-41 (Supp.
1988).
98. Miller and Bennett, Governmental Records: An Essential Element of Environ-
mental Due Diligence, 3 Toxics L. Rep. 920, 921 (1988).
99. CERCLA requires that sites targeted for Superfund cleanups be listed on the
National Priorities list, 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1983).
100. RCRA requires owners of underground storage tanks storing hazardous substances
to register such tanks, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6991(a) (West Supp. 1988). This program is often
administered at the state level, and many tanks remain unregistered.
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Securities Act of 1933101 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934102 must
disclose "material" information to the SEC, its shareholders, and its
prospective shareholders. The extent to which environmental litigation
is "material" is indicated by the SEC's Regulation S-K, which requires
disclosure of environmental litigation when there is serious personal
injury, property damage exceeding $50,000, a life-threatening situation,
or a release of radioactive materials or "etiologic agents"'' 3 (which
includes a "viable microorganism, or its toxin, which causes or may
cause human disease").1°4
If the property was once used or is proposed to be used by a shipper
or carrier, the Department of Transportation (DOT) should also be a
source of environmental information. DOT requires shippers and carriers
to notify federal authorities of "incidents" involving hazardous materials
in transportation. 105 Compliance data can also be obtained through DOT.'06
At the state level, records can usually be found as to the location
of underground storage tanks, the locations of landfills and other waste
disposal facilities, areas of radon contamination, asbestos records, dis-
charge permits, Community Right to Know disclosures, and other helpful
information.'0 7 There may also be a state agency which maintains "pri-
ority lists" for state funded cleanups, much like that kept by EPA.
Local health agencies and sanitation departments could also assist in
the search for information.
In Louisiana, La. R.S. 30:2194 requires underground storage tanks
of 1100 gallons or more to be registered with the Department of En-
vironmental Quality. Additionally, La. R.S. 30:2204 requires any owner,
operator, or responsible person of any site to notify the Department of
Environmental Quality's Office of Solid and Hazardous Waste of any
release or discharge of hazardous wastes. Yet, the Department of En-
vironmental Quality has no integrated filing system among the various
offices. Nor has the Department developed a system for handling the
increasing number of requests for information by persons attempting to
qualify for the third party defense. It is recommended that a request
for information relating to a specific company or individual be sent to
the Department under the Louisiana Public Records Act. 08 Apparently,
101. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (1981).
102. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 et seq. (1981).
103. 17 C.F.R. § 231.10 et seq. (1988).
104. 49 C.F.R. §§ 171.8 and 173.386(a)(1) (1988); 42 C.F.R. § 721 (1988).
105. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1802-04, 1808 (1976); 49 C.F.R. §§ 171.3, 171.8, 171.15-16 (1988);
49 Fed. Reg. 10490-10507 (1988).
106. Regulations pertaining to the public availability of DOT records can be found
in 49 C.F.R. 7 (1988).
107. Miller and Bennett, Government Records: An Essential Element of Environmental
Due Diligence, 3 Toxics L. Rep. 920, 922 (1988).
108. La. R.S. 44:1-41 (Supp. 1988).
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the records are kept by name rather than property description, and the
request will be circulated among the various offices to retrieve the
information. °9
In summary, lenders and purchasers should become familiar with
the type of information available within each agency and how that
information may affect the property. By doing so, the loan officer will
know which agency to contact for that specific information when a
given problem arises. The lender, by being unaware of the availability
of such information, runs the risk of having constructive knowledge of
the information in the public records. Furthermore, as awareness of the
environmental problems associated with real estate grows, the standards
for inquiry will increase." 0 It is likely, then, that review of government
records will become an essential element in every real estate transaction.
Once these record searches are completed, the lender should conduct
interviews with various parties connected with the property. This step
is designed to fulfill the "commonly known or reasonably ascertainable
information" requirement."' Ideally, the lender or purchaser will have
a list of names of former owners from its title search. A questionnaire
should be sent to each of these former owners to ascertain the previous
uses of the property. The same questionnaire should also be sent to the
transferor of the property and neighbors. Additionally, these parties
should be asked whether they ever leased the property to a third party,
because this information is usually not discovered in the chain of title
search. Next, the questionnaire should be sent to the former lessees.
Specifically, the lender or purchaser should inquire about environmental
compliance and past enforcement actions.
It is likely that many of the parties questioned will be reluctant to
release information; they may, for example, fear liability for misleading
statements in whatever information they disclose. It is important, how-
ever, that at least some attempt be made to get this information. If
the questionnaire goes unanswered, perhaps a follow up phone call would
be in order. All attempts to obtain this information should be docu-
mented. If there is still no response, the inference should be that the
information was not reasonably ascertainable, and the lender or pur-
chaser should be protected.
The final step of the phase I inquiry is the site inspection. This
does not include expensive chemical testing as is done in the environ-
mental audit, but rather requires only a simple visual examination of
the site by a knowledgeable party. For example, if the property is a
processing or manufacturing plant, the lender should have someone check
109. Telephone conversation with Gordon Green, Legal Affairs Office (April 5, 1989).
110. Miller and Bennett, supra note 107, at 922-23.
111. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(B) (West Supp. 1988).
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for: required pollution control equipment; for stains or evidence of
corrosion; for asbestos and PCB's; storage containers; fuel kept on site;
pipelines; and record keeping practices. If the site is unimproved land,
the terrain should be checked for discoloration, absence of vegetation,
filled areas, stormwater ditches or conduits, pits or lagoons, and the
presence of any wastes dispbsed of or stored on the site. Of course,
other types of diligence techniques may alert the lender or purchaser to
more specific evidence of contamination.
This does not mean that an extensive on site inspection should be
conducted in every transaction. However, the statute implies that some
type of inspection should be made. Section 101(35)(B) provides that the
"obviousness" of the contamination and the ability to detect the con-
tamination by an appropriate inspection must be considered by the
court. " 2 Because the lender will likely be perceived as a "deep pocket"
defendant, the court may be tempted to conclude that the statute requires
some type of visual inspection in every transaction, even if the other
diligence techniques do not raise suspicions about the property. This
will especially be true if the presence of the contamination could have
been readily discovered by a simple inspection of the site. Moreover,
the site inspection often discloses information not available elsewhere.
For example, an illegal dumper could have deposited barrels of wastes
on the site, and this fact could not be discovered from interviews or
from the public records. In large expensive transactions, or in those
where a doubt has been raised, the on-site inspection could be conducted
by an expert in the phase II environmental audit. In general, though,
someone should check the site for obvious contamination in every trans-
action.
It may be economically infeasible, however, to conduct an on-site
inspection in every transaction. Consultants that provide such services
typically charge several thousand dollars, an added cost that smaller
residential and commercial transactions simply cannot afford. Thus, it
has been suggested that phase I be separated into phase I(a), which
includes the questionnaire and record searches, and phase l(b), which
includes the on-site inspection." 3 Under this technique, the phase I(b)
inspection could be bypassed in smaller transactions where no suspicions
are raised by the phase I(a) investigation.
The above argument makes sense as far as commercial feasibility is
concerned, but it presents other problems in fulfilling the statutory
requirements. The "obviousness" of the contamination and the ability
to detect the contamination by an appropriate inspection suggests that
112. Id.
113. Bennett, Environmental Due Diligence: An Evolving National Standard, 3 Toxics
L. Rep. 1262, 1264 (1989),
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the due diligence inquiry could be inadequate where no inspection was
conducted. The "appropriate inspection" requirement could be inter-
preted as necessitating no inspection at all in circumstances where it is
commercially infeasible. However, such a reading ignores the statutory
requirement that the court consider the obviousness of the wastes on
the site.1 14 The structure can be useful, however, as long as some visual
inspection was conducted in phase I(a), perhaps by an appraiser trained
to recognize evidence of contamination. A more thorough site inspection
by an environmental consultant could be conducted in phase I(b) or in
phase II, if necessary. Furthermore, the argument that the on site
inspection is commercially infeasible in smaller transactions will become
less convincing as consultant firms develop and offer lower costs for a
higher volume of work.
The argument that some sort of site inspection must be conducted
in every transaction is reinforced by legislation currently being drafted
in Congress. The bill is being introduced in response to the inability to
define "all appropriate inquiry." The proposed definition would require
that the investigation include a title search, public records search, and
a visual site inspection in every transaction.l"5
Phase I is completed when all of the above mentioned procedures
have been done properly. Next, the lender or purchaser must evaluate
the information he has received to decide whether further investigation
is warranted. In reviewing documents, the lender should be especially
suspicious of evidence of previous uses of the property to produce
chemicals, pesticides, fertilizers, or types of manufacturing known to
present environmental problems. The documents should also be reviewed
to determine whether record keeping requirements have been complied
with. Otherwise, there will be doubt as to the presence of wastes from
undocumented activities. Prior enforcement actions should be reviewed
for the severity of the releases. Finally, this information should be
considered in conjunction with any problems that were discovered by
the on-site inspection. In addition, the statute requires that the defendant
consider the relationship of the purchase price to the value of the
property if uncontaminated.1 1 6 It is possible that this could be the sole
suspicious factor discovered during phase I, but could still be considered
enough to necessitate a phase II environmental audit.
114. But see United States v. Pacific Hide and Fur Depot Inc., 3 Toxics L. Rep.
1619 (D.C. Idaho 1989), where the district court held that "no inquiry" was "appropriate"
in an interfamilial gratuitous transaction where the children receiving the gift were "barely
out of their teenage years." The court went on to state that "[tihis is precisely the
situation designed to be covered by the innocent landowner defense."
115. 19 Envtl. Rep. 2569 (1989).
116. 42 U.S.C.A. § 101(35)(B) (West Supp. 1988); Miller and Bennett, Due Diligence
Techniques For the Innocent Purchaser/Lender, 3 Toxics L. Rep. 434, 438 (1988).
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If any of the above investigations would raise suspicions in a rea-
sonable person, considering the statutory limitations of this term, the
lender or purchaser should either reject the transaction or loan, or
proceed with the phase II environmental audit. If the transaction is a
very large one, the parties may decide to incur the expenses of further
investigation purely in the interest of caution.
PHASE II
The term "environmental audit" is loosely defined. Often it is used
to describe the entire investigatory process, while other times it is used
to describe any type of physical inspection of the property. For purposes
of this comment, the term will be used to refer only to soil or ground-
water sampling, or certain types of surface inspection or testing. The
reason for this restrictive definition is the conclusion that some type of
minimal visual inspection will be required in every transaction in order
to fulfill the statutory requirement that the defendant conduct an "ap-
propriate inquiry" into the "obviousness" of the presence of the con-
tamination, and the ability to detect the contamination by appropriate
inspection." 7 While the extent of the on-site inspection will vary according
to each individual transaction, the fact that some type of investigation
is necessary in order to claim the defense warrants the more restrictive
definition. Therefore, the simple on-site inspection is considered part of
the phase I inquiry, which should be conducted routinely, while the
more extensive on-site inspection is part of the environmental audit
conducted in Phase II.
Generally, an environmental audit is conducted by environmental
experts. The sampling process must be undertaken with accepted pro-
cedures to ensure the reliability of the test, and lenders and purchasers
are usually not able to properly conduct the audit themselves." 8 The
objectives are to identify the amount and types of contaminants in the
soil or groundwater and to predict the rate and direction of migration
of the contaminants. If the audit refutes the suspicions raised by the
phase I inquiry, the lender or purchaser may proceed with the transaction
without losing his defense. However, if the audit confirms suspicions
of contamination, the lender or purchaser is considered to have actual
knowledge of the contamination and may not claim the third party
defense. In addition, the parties should consider whether the contami-
nation must be reported to the appropriate government agency. More-
over, if title is finally taken, the purchaser must take reasonable steps
117. 42 U.S.C.A. § 101(35)(B) (West Supp. 1988).
118. Miller and Bennett, supra note 116, at 438.
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to prevent harm to the public, which could include a cleanup of the
property. 119
Even if a lender fulfills all of the above requirements, it still may
lose the third party defense. Section 101(35)(B) requires that the defen-
dant take the appropriate steps "in an effort to minimize liability."' 20
This language was interpreted by a former member of the Environmental
Protection Agency as requiring lenders to:
1) Avoid participation in the management of the borrower's
business ...
2) Where practicable, prohibit the handling of hazardous
waste by the borrower.
3) Where waste must be handled, require compliance prac-
tices and policies.
4) If possible, require'the borrower to obtain environmental
impairment liability insurance.
5) If the borrower's property is contaminated, consider re-
fraining from foreclosing and taking title. 12'
The implication is that failure to take the above steps could jeopardize
the defense.
While it is a good practice for a lender to attempt to follow each
of these suggestions, the absence of a contractual prohibition against
the borrower's handling or mishandling of certain wastes should not
destroy the defense. These provisions are often the subject of intense
negotiation and should not by themselves complete or destroy the third
party defense. Furthermore, there is no statutory authority for requiring
potential defendants to demand such provisions. The language "in an
effort to minimize liability" relates only to the appropriateness of the
investigation, not to any other defense or contractual protection device
available to defendants.
Even if the above suggestions are incorrect, lenders and purchasers
should include representations, warranties, covenants and indemnity pro-
visions in the transaction documents. The value of these provisions as
protection for the lender depend on the solvency of the borrower, and
may appear of little worth. However, they do help illustrate that the
lender made a diligent effort to discover the presence of the wastes. 22
This may help in avoiding liability under CERCLA by helping to show
119. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1983), provides that the defendant must exercise due care
with respect to the hazardous substance discovered.
120. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(B) (West Supp. 1988).
121. Miller and Bennett, supra note 116, at 435 (citing Reich and Leifer, The Effect
of CERCLA on Property Transfers).
122. King, supra note 59, at 286.
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that the lender or purchaser had no reason to know of the presence of
the contaminants.
The warranties should include a provision that the borrower knows
of no hazardous waste on the property before or during his ownership.
Another section should state that the borrower is now and will remain
in compliance with all environmental laws, that no conditions exist or
are likely to exist which would subject the borrower to an enforcement
action or other environmental liability, and that the borrower is not
currently involved in such actions. The borrower should also warrant
that he has all licenses and permits required by law. Finally, the borrower
should agree to notify the lender immediately of a breach of any of
the above conditions and representations."' e
Indemnity provisions in a contract may not be raised as a defense
to a CERCLA response action. 24 The same is true under Louisiana
law. "'25 But the validity of such agreements as between the parties are
specifically preserved in both the state and federal statutes. However,
as with warranties and covenants, they are only valuable as long as the
indemnitor remains solvent. In the lender/borrower relationship, there
is a significant chance that the borrower will be insolvent by the time
the agreement is invoked. Such a provision may be more valuable to
a purchaser receiving title from a solvent seller, since there is greater
likelihood that the seller will be solvent after the wastes are discovered.
Nevertheless, indemnity agreements can be as broad or as narrow as
the parties wish, and should be carefully negotiated.
Another protection device available to lenders is to avoid taking a
security interest at all, instead relying on a personal guaranty from a
solvent principal. Since the lender will never have to foreclose on the
property, it does not have to worry about claiming the third party
defense. Instead, the lender merely becomes a member of the group of
other creditors of the principal.
Finally a lender should be careful to remove from its loan documents
old provisions which could be construed as participating in the day to
day management of the borrower. Examples of these provisions include
control over selection of the borrower's management or participation in
the borrower's business operations. On the other hand, purely financial
controls such as net worth requirements should remain. 2 6 This will allow
the lender to protect its security interest without incurring the type of
liability imposed in the Mirabile case.
123. Id. at 286-87.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1) (1983).
125. La. R.S. § 30:2278 (1989).




As was explained in section II, a lessor may not assert the third
party defense for contamination caused by his lessee.12 7 Because of this,
the lessor should be particularly concerned about the allocation of rights
and responsibilities between the parties. There are a number of devices
available to the lessor to insure that the lessee will pay for any costs
associated with a clean up.
If the lessee's business involves the use of some hazardous substances,
the lessor should require the lessee to comply with all applicable en-
vironmental laws. Any hazardous substance not normally used in the
lessee's business should be barred from the premises. The lease should
specifically provide that the lessee will identify the substances expected
to be used or generated on the property, and that the lessee will notify
the lessor of any release of those substances .18 Such a release should
be grounds for default, triggering the lessor's right to terminate the
lease and collect response costs. This will at least enable the lessor to
prevent any further contamination of his property.
The lessor could also try to insert an indemnity clause in the lease.
The lessee will likely resist an over broad provision, so the scope of
the indemnity will have to be negotiated. Further, if the lessee will
agree, the lessor should negotiate a pass-through clause in which cleanup
costs would be passed on to the lessee as operating costs. The lessee
will likely limit this provision to any contamination caused by him, and
not contamination caused by the lessor or third parties. The same should
be true of maintenance covenants.'2 9 The lessor should also reserve the
right to refuse any assignment of the lease to a sublessee who might
increase the chances that the lessor will incur response costs.
Since the lessee should not be liable for prior contamination of the
site, his primary concern will be proving that the contamination occurred
prior to his lease. The lease should require the lessor to disclose past
uses of the property and any hazardous substances that may be located
there. Failure to do this would be grounds for termination or rescission
of the lease. The lessee should specifically exclude from his maintenance
responsibilities any liability for substances not released by him. Fur-
thermore, the lessee should demand to be indemnified for any liability
it incurs for release by the lessor or third parties. The lessor should be
required to notify the lessee of the presence or release of hazardous
substances that he discovers. Failure to comply with any of the above
127. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
128. Larson and Boman, "Environmental Liability: Lender and Landlord-Tenant Is-
sues," The Impact of Environmental Regulation on Business Transactions, Practicing Law




could be specified as grounds for termination of the lease, but this will
likely be the subject of negotiation. Finally, the lessee could request
that an environmental audit be performed at termination of the lease
so that he can prove that he was not responsible for any wastes deposited
there later.130
CONCLUSION
Lenders, purchasers, lessees and lessors all face serious environmental
liability in transactions involving immovable property. Lenders and pur-
chasers must be concerned with taking title to property and becoming
liable as "owners or operators" under CERCLA. In addition, lenders
must be concerned with becoming overly involved in the operation of
the borrower's business. Lessees share many of the same concerns as
purchasers, since they are acquiring an interest in property similar to
purchasers. Lessors, on the other hand, already own the property and
are more concerned with regulating the activities of lessees.
Lenders and purchasers must conduct a due diligence inquiry before
they acquire an interest in real property in order to later assert the third
party defense. This inquiry should be conducted in phases in the hope
of avoiding the expense of a full environmental audit. In all but single
family residential transactions, the inquiry should include a title search
for previous owners, a governmental records search for previous uses
of the property, and interviews of various parties discovered in the above
two searches and in the initial questionnaire completed by the borrower,
seller, or lessor. Finally, there should be at least some visual inspection
to discover obvious or easily ascertainable information about the prop-
erty. If any of the above raise the suspicions of a "reasonable" person,
as that term is limited by the statute, then an environmental audit should
be conducted. Only then may a defendant assert the third party defense.
Other protection devices are available by way of contract. The lender
or purchaser could demand warranties about the condition of the prop-
erty and the seller or borrower's knowledge about past disposal practices.
Compliance with environmental laws should be required, and an indem-
nity clause could be used to reimburse the lender or purchaser for any
costs incurred in responding to contamination caused by others. The
personal guaranty of the borrower's principals are useful both for col-
lecting the debt and as an assurance that the principals are negotiating
honestly and in good faith.
The lessor is in a different position, because he already owns the
property or, as a sublessor, is in the position of owner at the time of
the contamination. Since he cannot show that he "acquired" the property
130. Id. at 287-288.
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without actual or constructive knowledge about the presence of the
wastes, he cannot claim the third party defense. He must therefore rely
on contractual devices designed to prevent the contamination or shift
the responsibility to the lessee. Similarly, the lessee is not concerned
with the third party defense for contamination caused prior to his
possession of the property. Instead, he is concerned with the contractual
relationship with his lessor during his possession of the property. Dis-
closure, maintenance, notice, and indemnity provisions should all be
considered when negotiating a lease with a potential environmental risk.
The statutory scheme is workable only if it is interpreted in light
of the economic feasibility of fulfilling the statutory requirements on a
regular basis. The statute attempts to deal with the problem of increased
transactional costs by incorporating the language "consistent with good
commercial or customary practices," but then compounds the problem
by specifying a variety of factors that the court must consider in each
transaction. A party wishing to claim the defense must therefore develop
a specific technique to fulfill each factor, which increases the transac-
tional costs. However, as uniform due diligence techniques established
in the secondary market and elsewhere develop and become accepted as
"good commercial practices," there will be no need to overspend due
to the uncertainty of qualifying for the defense. Moreover, as companies
develop the capacity to handle due diligence inquiries at a higher volume,
the costs of investigating a particular property will be reduced. Thus,
the statute is workable in its present form, provided the courts follow
the lead of the secondary market institutions as they attempt to develop
an economically feasible approach to the third party defense.
Scott C. Seiler
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